Abstract
Sprague [1915, p. 513] , in a follow-up to his classic 1910 study of crises under the National Banking System, applauds the decision to close the Exchange: "If the stock exchange had not closed on Friday, July 31, it is certain that the decline in the price of securities during the day would have been so extreme as to have occasioned numerous failures of brokers and their customers and presumably much loss to the banks as well." Friedman and Schwartz [1963, 1 A contemporaneous view of the crisis is summarized in Noble [1915, pp.13-4] and Sprague [1915] . More recent perspectives appear in Friedman and Schwartz [1963, p.172] , Meltzer [2003, p.82] , and Sobel [1968, p.327-331] . October, 1914 . He is considered the most influential member of the Federal Reserve System during its formative years (see Friedman and Schwartz [1963, p.225, 411] and Meltzer [2003, p.193] . 3 The London Stock Exchange and the Paris Bourse suspended normal trading during this period, but, unlike the United States, England and France had already been drawn into the war. The Wall Street Journal [September 28, 1914] indicated that the Bourse remained closed, in part, "because so many exchange members had joined the army." Michie [1999, p.144 ] makes a similar point when explaining the reasons for London's closing: "Germans were the single most important group of non-British among both members and clerks." Keynes [1915, p. 462] adds that "…the failure of an important firm…who were largely concerned in business with Germany brought home to members of the Stock Exchange the character of the situation." Keynes [p. 461] Table 1 shows the six stocks that traded during that 30-minute session.
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II.2.2 Stock Prices During August and September
Evidence that stock prices were stable accumulated during August and September. I have shown (see Silber [2003] ) that prices on New Street, the substitute market that traded NYSE listed stocks in the street, were virtually unchanged during the last few days of August compared with the closing prices In late October New Street prices declined by about 9 percent compared with July 30 closing prices because of adverse developments in Europe (see Silber [2003] and Noble [1915, p.43] to causes over which we had no control the organization was not perfected by that date. The fact that the Board itself has been organized means that the Banks can certainly be organized by the 1 st of October, or sooner."
The Federal Reserve Act conferred the right to set the date for opening the regional Banks on the Secretary of the Treasury (see Meltzer [2003, p.74fn] Under the rules of the gold standard, the exchange rate between U.S.
dollars and British pounds (Sterling) fluctuated in a narrow range around $4.8665
per British pound, the mint parity exchange rate determined by the gold content of the dollar and the pound (see Yeager [1966] ). The demand for British pounds versus dollars should never, under normal circumstances, force the exchange rate above the mint parity by more than the cost of shipping gold to London.
Under those conditions, it would pay to ship gold to satisfy obligations abroad rather than to buy Sterling above the 'gold export point'.
Estimates of the gold export point varied with shipping costs and [July 31, 1914] explains the premium on Sterling as follows: "There was a large short interest in the market when Austria surprised the world by sending her ultimatum to Servia [Serbia], representing those who had sold for future delivery…While there was no immediate necessity for evening up their commitments, the shorts were faced with the possibility that even higher rates would obtain when their obligations fell due." On August 5 th the Wall Street Journal continued: "The banks have already sold the exchange against the gold, and unless the metal goes forward…they will be that much 'short' of exchange." 17 The Wall Street Journal noted on July 31 st that the "increase in the cost of insuring gold shipments had raised the gold export point."
Bankers supported the suspension of trading on the New York Stock Exchange and the issuance of Aldrich-Vreeland currency because they both served to conserve gold. 18 The New York Times said on August 1 st : "…the closing of the Exchange put an additional barrier in the way of gold export, and perhaps it was the only means to that end which was at hand." Closing the Exchange would help prevent gold exports even if every potential European seller were met by a domestic U. S. purchaser to produce stable stock prices.
European sellers were likely to present checks for payment to domestic U.S.
banks and demand gold, the only universally acceptable medium of exchange. circulation provided under the Aldrich-Vreeland Act…which will supply any local demand for cash without putting it out in a form that could be immediately taken for export."
Note the specificity of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act. It resolved the problem of a domestic shortage of gold because it provided legal tender within the U. S. but 18 Bankers also supported the suspension of trading because they worried about the impairment of the stock exchange collateral backing their brokers' loans. They were safe as long as prices remained officially frozen at the July 30 closing quotes. Stable New Street prices minimized this problem. 19 Sprague [1915, p. 510] says: "…the disturbing effect of these [stock exchange] sales was almost wholly due to the fact that they were sales by foreign holders rather than [because of] the quantities offered for sale." 20 The availability of Aldrich-Vreeland currency also made up for the illiquidity of brokers' loans (the stock exchange collateral could not be sold). Sprague [1915, p.513] says:" The effects upon banks of locking up part of their assets…proved less serious than was at first anticipated." He goes on to say [p.519]: "Thanks again to the emergency notes …the banks were able to meet requirements for additional loans occasioned by the crisis."
it did not satisfy international requirements. How did the bankers prepare to meet foreign obligations? They formed a gold pool.
III.1 The Gold Pool
On As a private banker, Strong had taken an active roll in the formation of the gold pool because he believed that only gold could insure U.S. credit worthiness in Europe [Chandler, p.58] . As a central banker, Strong believed that the Federal Reserve Banks should hold far more gold than required by law. Chandler [p.83] quotes Strong as saying: "We need an immense safety factor beyond the legal minimum and it is for this reason that I have been so urgent about accumulating gold."
23 Strong also wanted to make the dollar "an international currency by
[creating] confidence in the redeemability of dollars in gold at all times [Chandler, p.84] ."
As long as Sterling remained above the gold export point, Strong worried that the stock of gold in the U.S. would ebb towards Europe. On October 10 th he wrote to Paul Warburg: "If the Federal Reserve Banks refuse to pay gold they will be discredited at the outset, and gold will certainly be demanded of them if they expand their note issues when gold will be at a premium…the premium as reflected in the price of sterling [Chandler, p.61] ." Figure 1 Figure 1 plots the exchange rate for 'demand Sterling' (rather than for cable transfers). According to Sprague [1915, p. 
